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There are increasing tensions between the First Amendment and the
common law torts of intentional infliction of emotional distress,
defamation, and privacy.
This Article discusses the conflicting
interactions among the three models that are competing for primacy as the
tort law governing expressive activities evolves to accommodate the
requirements of the First Amendment. At one extreme there is the model
that expression containing information which has been lawfully obtained
that contains neither intentional falsehoods nor incitements to immediate
violence can only be sanctioned in narrowly defined exceptional
circumstances, even if that expression involves matters that are universally
regarded as being of no public interest. At the other extreme is the model
that some expression which, though lawfully obtained, reveals to a wider
audience intimate private information about another should be subject to
sanction, as should verbal abuse of a private figure even if there is no
implicit threat of physical violence. Some provisions of the American
Restatement adopted with scant attention to constitutional developments
have taken, and to some extent continue to take, that position. Finally,
there is an intermediate model—now gaining wide-spread support in
Europe and to some extent in America, even among some members of the
United States Supreme Court—that expression which does not concern
matters of “public concern” can be subject to public sanction even if it has
been lawfully acquired and involves no threats of physical aggression
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against others. This Article sets out how this confusing impasse has come
about and the dangers that this lack of clarity present for freedom of
expression.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In Snyder v. Phelps, 1 the Supreme Court upheld the right of
members of the Westboro Baptist Church to picket near the funeral of a
Marine killed in Iraq. The signs they displayed to express their
contempt for the increasingly tolerant attitude of the United States
military towards homosexuals were certainly vulgar and offensive.
Snyder, the father of the deceased Marine, brought an action against
Phelps, the pastor of the Westboro church, to recover for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. The picketing was carried on silently at
an area designated by the police approximately 1,000 feet from the
Catholic church where the funeral was held. Although the funeral
procession on its way to the church came within 200 to 300 feet of the
demonstrators, Snyder did not notice the signs during the procession.
He only became aware of the signs the picketers were carrying later
while watching a television news broadcast of the event. 2 Snyder
succeeded in the district court, but that judgment was overturned by the
Fourth Circuit, whose decision was in turn affirmed by the Supreme
Court. 3 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, accepted that the
speech in question might meet the requirements for an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress but declared that, because the
issue involved was a matter of public concern, it was protected by the
First Amendment. 4 Justice Alito, the lone dissenter, noted that the
1.
2.
3.
4.

131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
Id. at 1213–14.
Id. at 1214.
Id. at 1217–19.
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elements of the tort “are difficult to meet” but the respondents had
“abandoned any effort to show that those tough standards were not
satisfied.” 5 Since Phelps did not pursue the point on appeal and the
majority had proceeded on the assumption that those requirements had
been met, 6 Justice Alito thought that the common law tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, as well as the doctrine of fighting words
enunciated in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 7 could be applied to
provide Snyder a remedy without offending the Constitution. Although
he concurred with the majority, Justice Breyer thought that there was
some merit to Justice Alito’s view that the doctrine of fighting words
enunciated in Chaplinsky could be used to justify an award of damages
against Phelps and his followers and also that there might be some
situations in which the common law doctrine of intentional infliction of
emotional distress could be applied to public speech. 8
That at least two Justices thought that there might be some life left
in the “fighting words” doctrine is surprising. In the absence of a
dramatic change of heart on the part of the Court, it is hard to believe
that calling a law enforcement officer a “God damned racketeer” and a
“damned Fascist,” 9 the words for whose utterance Chaplinsky was
convicted, would now subject a person to criminal sanctions since a host
of decisions post-Chaplinsky have made it clear that hate speech or any
other kind of vituperation can only be punished if it amounts to a threat
or incitement to imminent violence and is also likely to produce that
violence. 10
These developments included decisions involving
demonstrations in front of abortion clinics in which the Court, with
some dissent, upheld injunctions and statutes that restricted the ability
of anti-abortion groups or persons to demonstrate or attempt to engage
in unwanted conversations in the immediate vicinity of an abortion

5. Id. at 1223 (Alito, J., dissenting).
6. Id.
7. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
8. Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1221 (Breyer, J., concurring).
9. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569 (internal quotation marks omitted).
10. See, for example, Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), one of the many iterations
of that position. A recent state court decision, State v. Mitchell, 343 S.W.3d 381 (Tenn. 2011),
is informative on the need for a real threat of violence. See also Bible Believers v. Wayne
Cnty., 765 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2014). Indeed, there is even some authority that the speaker
must also actually intend to produce that imminent violence. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444 (1969).
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clinic, 11 but they all involved situations in which a reasonable person
could believe that her access to a clinic was being physically blocked or
that she was the victim of physical intimidation. More recently, all the
members of the Court agreed on the unconstitutionality of a
Massachusetts statute prohibiting members of the public who were
“using the public sidewalk or street right-of-way adjacent to [a
reproductive health care] . . . facility” to reach a destination “other than
such facility” from coming within a radius of thirty-five feet of the
facility during business hours unless they were entering or leaving the
premises or employees, law enforcement officers, or persons with a
business reason, such as contractors or utility workers. 12 There was no
evidence in the record that the petitioners, who were trying to
discourage abortions, had engaged in any acts of violence or harassment
or had blocked or impeded access to the facility. For similar reasons,
one might accept that, given the great number of people who might
attend a funeral, a much larger temporary buffer zone could be justified
in such situations. 13
11. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707 (2000) (statute forbidding anyone within 100
feet of the clinic to approach a person within eight feet for the purpose of distributing a
pamphlet or engaging in an unconsented conversation upheld); Schenk v. Pro-Choice
Network of W.N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (preliminary injunction prohibiting demonstrations
within fifteen feet of the entrances, driveways, or parking lot entrances to the clinic upheld; a
floating fifteen foot buffer zone around people entering or leaving the clinic struck down);
Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (injunction prohibiting
demonstrators to picket within 300 foot buffer zone around abortion clinic and residences of
staff and from property within 36 feet of clinic struck down; 36 foot buffer around entrances
and driveway of clinic upheld). In Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988), all members of the
Court agreed that picketing outside a particular residence could be prohibited. 487 U.S. at
483, 488. In dissenting, Justices Brennan and Marshall declared that such a prohibition would
require a showing that the picketing was “intrusive or coercive.” Id. at 492–94 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens in his dissent declared that such a prohibition required a showing
that the picketing “unreasonably interferes with the privacy of the home and does not serve a
reasonable communicative purpose.” Id. at 499 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
12. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2526 (2014) (internal quotation mark
omitted). The Massachusetts statute in question was MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 266,
§ 120E½(b)(4) (West 2012).
13. A number of states have adopted provisions prohibiting activity within specified
limits that might disturb a funeral or impede access to the site of the funeral. Many of these
statutes—often called “fallen hero acts” because many of the recent demonstrations had been
at military funerals—are undoubtedly modeled on federal legislation that among other things
limits certain activity for a period of 120 minutes from before and after a funeral within
distances of 300 feet (noise or disturbance of the peace) and 500 feet (impeding access to the
funeral site). See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1387–88 (2012); 38 U.S.C. § 2413 (2012). N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-288.4(8)a (2011), amended by Act of Mar. 6, 2013, S.L. 2013-6, sec. 1, 2013 N.C. Sess.
Laws 44, 45, which deals with “disorderly conduct,” prohibits, two hours before and after a
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In accepting that a scarcely visible silent demonstration 1,000 feet
from a funeral procession could not be forbidden because the
demonstration concerned an important public issue, Snyder strongly
suggests the implicit acceptance by all of the Justices that the common
law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress could be applied to
expressive activities carried out in public if the expression in question
involved neither a matter of public concern nor any hint of a threat of
physical violence. This is a troubling development. It should be noted
that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is of relatively
recent origin. It was first recognized by the American Law Institute in a
1948 supplement to the Restatement of Torts 14 without recognition of the
constitutional issues that would arise if it were applied to expressive
activities, and as we shall describe later in this article, it was retained in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts 15 and now in the Restatement (Third)
of Torts. 16
Although, like most people, appalled by the behavior of Phelps and
his followers, I believe that the result reached by the Court was the
correct one. Nevertheless, I find the reasoning in Chief Justice
Roberts’s opinion for the majority, let alone the reasoning in the
dissenting and concurring opinions, troubling. I find it puzzling that the
Chief Justice attempted to make some accommodation to common law
developments that, as I shall demonstrate in this Article, have occurred
with surprisingly little effort made to anticipate even obvious
constitutional trends. As we shall see, this almost conscious disregard of
evolving constitutional trends is not limited to the relatively minor tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. It has also been displayed
in the modern development of the more publicly prominent torts of
defamation and invasion of privacy. Might the Court now be signaling
that it may be experiencing some qualms about having tilted the balance
too strongly in favor of freedom of expression? I would find that
unfortunate. What may in the long run be equally unfortunate is that,
by breathing new life into the notion of “public” concern—a factor that
funeral or memorial service, displaying within 500 feet and with intent to impede, disrupt,
disturb or interfere with such service of “any visual image that conveys fighting words or
actual or imminent threats of harm directed to any person or property” and the utterance of
“loud, threatening, or abusive language, . . . or yelling” that would interfere with the service.
14. R ESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948).
15. R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
16. R ESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 46 (2012).
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for a time looked as if it had been thoroughly discarded as the criterion
for deciding what speech can be legally proscribed—the Court is
perhaps also unwittingly opening the door to the restrictions on even
truthful expression concerning events which have clearly occurred in
public space that have been imposed in Europe, including the United
Kingdom. To fully appreciate the scope of what is at stake we must first
describe the increasingly frequent and awkward interaction between
constitutional law and the common law of torts. We shall start that
discussion with defamation because it is not only by far the oldest of the
three common law torts involving expressive activities but was also the
area in which the conflict between the Constitution and tort law first
arose. After we have laid the groundwork, we shall conclude by
examining the important policy issues that, whether we like it or not,
must be resolved in order to develop a coherent body of law delimiting
the scope of freedom of expression.
II. DEFAMATION
In the first 175 years of its existence, the Supreme Court of the
United States made no attempt to apply the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution to common law torts. In the pre-Erie v.
Tompkins 17 era, in which the federal courts applied a federal common
law in diversity cases, the Court of course did hear some defamation
cases, but these were decided on the basis of accepted common law with
no mention of the First Amendment. In the post-Erie period, when the
typical common law case involving freedom of expression in diversity
cases was to be decided under state common law, there was initially
probably less reason to expect the Court to get involved. The Court
nevertheless in 1942 did hear a case brought in the federal courts in
which a congressman had brought a libel action against a newspaper
that accused him of having opposed a judicial nomination because the
nominee was Jewish. The Court split four-to-four in affirming, without
opinion, 18 the Second Circuit’s ruling that, under New York law, the
congressman had stated a valid cause of action. 19 In its petition for
certiorari and its brief on the merits, the newspaper’s principal argument
17. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
18. Schenectady Union Pub. Co. v. Sweeney, 316 U.S. 642 (1942).
19. Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Pub. Co., 122 F.2d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1941). Clark, J.,
dissented on the ground that the majority’s reversal of the district court’s granting of a motion
to dismiss was based on an inaccurate reading of New York law and, moreover, was
“disturbing law.” Id. at 291 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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was that the Court of Appeals had wrongly interpreted New York law.20
It did, however, as did the two amici, also make a constitutional
challenge, but not with specific mention of the First Amendment, which
is perhaps not completely surprising since the few prior occasions in
which the Court had held that the principles underlying the First
Amendment were subsumed into the Fourteenth Amendment involved
criminal prosecutions. 21 By the 1960s, however, some important
changes had occurred in the legal and political universe. As far as the
legal side was involved, the Court had increasingly begun ruling that
some provisions of the Bill of Rights were word-for-word applicable to
the states by incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than
merely expressing fundamental principles that were entitled to
protection against state infringement by the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.22 More importantly perhaps
from a practical perspective, the Court had by this time also expressly
ruled that the enforcement of a state’s common law, even in litigation
between private parties, could sometimes be considered state action and
thus subject to the prohibitions on state action imposed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. 23 The stage was thus set for New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan. 24
The facts of the Sullivan case are too well known to require
extensive rehearsal here. For present purposes it suffices to note that
the case involved an action by the elected commissioner of public affairs
of the City of Montgomery, Alabama, in overall charge of the city’s
public safety departments, who claimed he had been defamed by an
advertisement published in the Times that criticized the actions of the
20. E.g., Petitioner’s Brief at 9, Schenectady Union Pub. Co. v. Sweeney, 316 U.S. 642
(1942).
21. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); cf. Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652 (1925). Justice Stone’s famous footnote 4 in his opinion for the Court in United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938), declared that “[t]here may be narrower
scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten
amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth,” but made no mention of state common law. 304 U.S. at 152 n. 4.
22. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Sixth Amendment right to
counsel); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (right to exclude evidence obtained in violation
of Fourth Amendment). Cf. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), which
could be interpreted as presaging that result even for civil litigation involving the First
Amendment.
23. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
24. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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police in their dealings with Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and others
involved in civil rights demonstrations and activities. 25 Writing through
Justice Brennan, the Court reversed the judgment of the Alabama
courts, which had awarded Sullivan the full amount of the $500,000 in
damages he had sought from the Times and the people whose names
had appeared in the list of the advertisement’s sponsors. 26 As Justice
Brennan noted, the Court was determining “for the first time the extent
to which the constitutional protections for speech and press limit a
State’s power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public
official against critics of his official conduct.” 27 Thus began the odyssey,
which still continues today, to determine the extent to which the
Sullivan case and its progeny have altered the traditional common law
governing tort liability for expressive conduct. It continues, as we shall
see, because the Court has been unable to muster a consistent majority
over time as to what exactly are the broader principles underlying its
post-Sullivan decisions nor exactly how much of the evolving common
law governing other types of expressive activity might also similarly be
affected by constitutional considerations. In Sullivan itself all the
Justices agreed that a public official who sought to recover in a
defamation action against his critics could not recover unless he could
show with “convincing clarity” 28 that the defendant either knew that his
statements were false or was recklessly indifferent to the truth or falsity
of his statements. Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg thought there
was even what Justice Goldberg termed “an absolute, unconditional
privilege to criticize official conduct despite the harm which may flow
from excesses and abuses.” 29 Justice Goldberg, joined by Justice
Douglas, opined, however, that the traditional common law of
defamation still applied to defamatory statements concerning the
private conduct of public officials. 30
In the immediate aftermath of the Sullivan case, the Court labored
to establish the extent to which the First Amendment limited the
common law. In the course of that effort it gave some guidance as to
how far down the hierarchy of public employees the notion of who was a

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 256–61.
Id. at 256, 292.
Id. at 256.
Id. at 285–86.
Id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring in the result).
Id. at 301–02.
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public official might extend. 31 The notion that the authority of a public
employee to exercise discretionary powers was helpful but certainly did
not provide definitive guidance. The Court also had to decide whether
the Sullivan doctrine applied to public figures who engaged in discourse
about political and other public issues. And then, after deciding that
Sullivan did apply, 32 it faced the issue whether Sullivan should also apply
if the plaintiff was neither a public official nor a public figure but the
challenged statements concerned the plaintiff’s involvement in what
might be called “an event of public or general concern.” 33 A plurality of
the Court, in 1971, declared that it did in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc. 34 Justice White did not endorse this statement but agreed with the
Third Circuit’s reversal of the district court’s judgment for the plaintiff
in that case because the challenged statement was made in the context
of reporting on official conduct. 35 Justice Black in his concurrence went
even further than the plurality in asserting that “the First Amendment
does not permit the recovery of libel judgments against the news media
even when statements are broadcast with knowledge they are false.” 36
While the Court was wrestling with the ramifications of its decision
in Sullivan, the American Law Institute was working on drafts of the
defamation sections for the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The most
controversial item in its drafts was its proposal to abandon the English
doctrine that some damages were presumed in all libel actions, even if
the challenged statements were not defamatory on their face. 37 The
reporter, William L. Prosser, was seeking to move to what he claimed
was the majority American position, namely that, in such cases, a
plaintiff could not recover without proof of special damages for
defamatory statements that were not defamatory on their face unless the

31. See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (former supervisor of county recreation
area was a public figure); see also Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979)
(recipient of federal research grant not a public figure).
32. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
33. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 62 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
36. Id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Douglas, who did not
participate in the decision of the case, might possibly have agreed with Justice Black’s
statement. He certainly would have accepted the plurality’s position.
37. The controversy is discussed in George C. Christie, Defamatory Opinions and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, 75 MICH. L. R EV. 1621 (1977), and concerned revision of
section 569 of the Restatement of Torts contained in tentative drafts eleven (1965) and twelve
(1966) of the proposed Restatement (Second) of Torts.
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defamatory statement fell within the categories that were actionable
without proof of special damages in slander cases. 38 This proved quite
controversial, and Prosser’s position was challenged as in fact not
accurately reporting the predominant American view on the subject. 39
The controversy only subsided after Prosser gave up the fight when an
important decision of the New York Court of Appeals 40 reaffirmed the
English common law doctrine, and section 569 of the Restatement’s
adoption of the English common law position was accordingly retained
in section 569 of the Restatement (Second). 41 What is remarkable is that
while this argument was going on the drafters of the Restatement
(Second) ignored the serious implications of the Court’s decision in the
Sullivan case on the future development of the common law of
defamation. As late as April 27, 1966, more than two years after
Sullivan, Tentative Draft No. 12 was released, which contained the
following illustration to section 580 which was retained from the
Restatement and dealt with “unintended defamation”:
A publishes in his newspaper a news item saying that B has been
arrested and charged with murder. A has received this
information from police headquarters, from an official always
found to be reliable in the past, and A honestly and reasonably
believes it to be true. It is in fact false. A is subject to liability
to B. 42
This provision and the illustration just quoted were of course
dropped from this portion of the Restatement (Second) when it was
published in 1977. Nevertheless, even though the Court was then only
beginning to work out the implications of its introduction of
constitutional law into what had previously been considered the
common law of tort, Prosser’s failure to even mention the Sullivan case
surely shows an extremely blinkered view of what is relevant in tort
litigation and scholarship. The Court’s decision in the Rosenbloom case
was surely not a total surprise. In 1969, the Third Circuit, whose
decision in the Rosenbloom case was affirmed by the Court, had no

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See Christie, supra note 37, at 1621–22.
Id.
Hinsdale v. Orange Cnty. Publ’ns, Inc., 217 N.E.2d 650 (N.Y. 1966).
R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (1977).
R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580 illus. 3 (Tentative Draft No. 12, 1966).
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difficulty in concluding that the implications of Sullivan had to be
considered in that case. 43
This reluctance to even consider possible constitutional issues in the
discussion of tort questions continued through May of 1974, when the
American Law Institute considered for final adoption a proposed
section 567A which Prosser had first proposed in 1965. 44 That provision
simply declared that “[a] defamatory communication may consist of
words or other matter which ridicule another.” 45 Over some objection,
an overwhelming majority of the Institute’s members at the May 1974
annual meeting in Washington adopted it for inclusion in the new
Restatement (Second), as well as a provision taken from section 566 of
the Restatement that “a statement of opinion based upon facts known or
assumed” was also actionable. 46 This decision to include both these
provisions in the Restatement (Second) seems bizarre for two reasons.
First, they fly in the face of section 558 of the Restatement 47 and
section 558 of the Restatement (Second) 48 that expressly declare that
“[t]o create liability . . . there must be an unprivileged publication of
false and defamatory matter.” Secondly there is no consideration of the
possible unconstitutionality of those proposed rules of law. As is well
known, some six weeks later the Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 49
declared that there is “no such thing as a false idea” and that “[h]owever
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.” 50
As a consequence, unless an opinion could be reasonably construed to
imply the existence of defamatory facts which form the basis for that
opinion, there could be no liability in defamation. Not surprisingly the
American Law Institute did not include section 567A in the final version
and reworded section 566 to accord with the Gertz decision.

43. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 415 F.2d 892, 896 (3d Cir. 1969), aff’d 403 U.S. 29
(1971).
44. R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 567A (Tentative Draft No. 11, 1965).
45. Id.
46. Report of the Nominating Committee, 51 A.L.I. PROC. 337, 339 (1974); see also
R ESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 566 (1938).
47. R ESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 558 (1938) (emphasis added).
48. R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977) (emphasis added).
49. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
50. Id. at 339–40. This statement was characterized as “dictum” in Alfred Hill,
Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLUM. L. R EV. 1205, 1239–40
(1976).
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The most important contribution of Gertz to the body of
constitutional law generated by the Sullivan case was its separation of
the universe of defamation plaintiffs into two classes, public officials and
public figures on the one hand, and private figures on the other. 51 The
former, even if they had not engaged in political or other public
controversies, were required to prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the statements in question were false and that the defendant had
made those statements either knowing that they were false or recklessly
indifferent to their truth or falsity. 52 On the other hand, if the plaintiff
were a private person all he would have to show is that the statements in
question were false and that the defendant was at fault in some regard in
ascertaining the truth or falsity of his statements. 53 Only if punitive or
presumed damages were sought would a private figure be obliged to
meet the Sullivan standard of showing with clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant knew that his statements were false or was
at least recklessly indifferent to their truth or falsity. 54 Writing for the
Court, Justice Powell declared that making the necessary degree of fault
depend on the status of the plaintiff was preferable to “forcing state and
federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address
issues of ‘general or public interest’ . . . . We doubt the wisdom of
committing this task to . . . judges.” 55 Justice White, in his dissent in
Gertz, understandably interpreted the Court’s decision as “requiring the
plaintiff in each and every defamation action to prove not only the
defendant’s culpability beyond his act of publishing defamatory material
but also actual damage to reputation resulting from the publication” 56
and requiring all defamation plaintiffs to show knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard of truth in order to recover punitive damages. 57 The
drafters of the final version of the Restatement (Second) certainly
thought that this was the actual holding of Gertz. 58 This is an important
point because it seemed to make clear that the Court was not about to
authorize courts to decide what information that was neither false nor
obscene nor an advocacy of imminent violence could still be subject to
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341–48.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 349.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 370 (White, J., dissenting).
Id.
R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B (1977).
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legal sanction because a judge might think that the subject matter
involved did not concern a matter of public interest or concern.
Whatever the value of the distinction between public and private
persons might be, the apparent clarity of the distinction enunciated in
Gertz has been muddied by subsequent decisions of the Court that
undoubtedly reflect the gradual change in the composition of the Court.
After the retirement of Justice Stewart in 1981, the only remaining
members of the Court that had decided the Sullivan case were Justice
Brennan, who wrote the opinion for the Court, and Justice White who,
after joining in the Court’s opinion in Sullivan, dissented in Gertz and,
as we shall soon see, from then on urged the Court to return as much as
possible to something close to the traditional common law position. 59 In
Gertz itself the Court spoke of the hypothetical defendants in
defamation cases as publishers or broadcasters, suggesting that the
abolishment of the strict liability of the common law of defamation
when the plaintiff was a private figure only applied when the defendant
was a member of the press or the broadcast media. 60 Not only was this
confusing because, in legal parlance, one who utters a defamatory
statement has “published” that statement, but also because whenever
the precise issue has actually been raised, the Court has always ruled
that the press has no greater freedom of expression than do
individuals. 61 And were it to abandon this position, one wonders how
the Court would decide whether a blog can be considered part of the
press or explain why a book should not enjoy the same privileges of
expression as does a tabloid newspaper.
Nevertheless, the Court continues to make statements that suggest
that there is something to the distinction between what are called the
media and everyone else. For example, in Philadelphia Newspapers,
Inc. v. Hepps, 62 decided in 1986, the Court ruled in a five-to-four
decision that, in an action for defamation brought by a private person
against a newspaper on a matter of “public” concern, the plaintiff bore
the burden of persuasion on the issue of falsity. 63 That this should be a
contested issue seems surprising since even the Restatement (Second),
when it was finally officially published post-Gertz, took this for
59. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 369–404 (White, J., dissenting). He felt that the way to
accommodate the constitutional considerations was to focus primarily on limiting damages.
60. Id. at 332–50.
61. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
62. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
63. Id. at 775–76, 778–79.
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granted. 64 Even more surprising, the Court reserved the question as to
whether this would also be true if the defendant were not a member of
the media. 65 Justices Brennan and Blackmun, who otherwise joined the
Court’s opinion, disagreed with the reservation of that issue because
“such a distinction is irreconcilable with the . . . First Amendment.” 66
Possibly even more surprising was the dissenting opinion written by
Justice Stevens, and joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices White
and Rehnquist, who argued that, as long as the plaintiff was a private
figure, the defendant could constitutionally be saddled with the burden
of proving truth in any defamation action. 67
What is troubling in this process of legal evolution is not that it is
merely one more illustration of Anthony D’Amato’s observation that
case-by-case development of the law, rather than producing clarity,
often leads to greater confusion in legal doctrine, 68 or even that it
reminds us that, in ideologically charged areas of the law, a change in
the prevailing public mood as well as in a court’s personnel can
sometimes make a big difference. Rather, for present purposes, the
most disturbing aspect of the Hepps case was the resurrection of the
notion that the extent of constitutional protection of expression should
depend on whether that expression concerns a matter of public or
private concern. Such a move was prefigured by Justice Powell’s
opinion for the three-judge plurality in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 69 declaring that presumed and punitive
damages could be recovered in a defamation case brought by a private
figure to recover for defamatory statements that did not concern a
matter of “public concern” without any showing of aggravated fault. 70
The two other Justices who made up the majority, Chief Justice Burger

64. R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A cmt. b (1977) notes that this is what
the logic of the Court’s decisions suggests and refers the reader to § 613 cmt. j, which declares
that “[r]ecent decisions of the United States Supreme Court hold that under the Constitution
a plaintiff must show fault on the part of the defendant regarding the truth or falsity of the
defamatory communication.”
65. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 778–79.
66. Id. at 780 (internal quotation mark omitted), per Justice Brennan, who quoted from
his dissent joined by Justice Blackmun and the two other dissenting Justices in Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 781 (1985), which will be discussed
shortly.
67. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 780–81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
68. Anthony D’Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CALIF. L. R EV. 1 (1983).
69. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
70. Id. at 757–61.
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and Justice White, wanted to overrule most of Gertz and return to the
traditional common law. 71 How Justice Powell could assert in Gertz that
determining what was in the “public or general interest” should not be
delegated to the “conscience of judges and juries” and then twelve years
later make the issue of “public concern” one which judges, juries, or
both must decide is beyond me. 72 Indeed, Justice White, who wanted to
do more than uphold the judgment for the plaintiff rendered in the state
courts, felt compelled to point out that he “had thought that the decision
in Gertz was intended to reach cases that involve any false statements of
fact injurious to reputation, whether the statement is made privately or
publicly and whether or not it implicates a matter of public
importance.” 73
I am particularly concerned about the implications of these
developments in the law of defamation for many other areas of
American law concerned with expression. It is well-known that, even in
the United Kingdom, it has been recognized that the strict liability
normally imposed by the common law for defamatory statements is no
longer always appropriate in a democratic society.74 Rather than adopt
the more radical approach taken by the United States Supreme Court in
the Sullivan case, however, the House of Lords in the Reynolds 75 case
broadened the common law privilege of “common interest,” which
permits a person who had made a defamatory false statement to escape
liability if he can show that he honestly believed in the truth of his
statement and that he and the recipients of the statement shared a
common interest to which the statement in question was germane. 76
Common interest could include business relations, membership in a
family, or even joint membership in a religious or social organization. 77
Reynolds extended the so-called common interest to include what was
called a common “public interest.” 78 In Reynolds, and the subsequent

71. Id. at 764 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
72. Compare Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339, 346 (1974) (internal
quotation marks omitted), with Dun, 472 U.S. at 763.
73. Dun, 472 U.S. at 772 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); see supra text
accompanying note 56.
74. See Christie, supra note 37, at 1627–28.
75. Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.) (appeal taken from
Eng.).
76. Id. at 192–94.
77. See id. at 194.
78. Id. at 195.
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cases which have fleshed out its reach, 79 expression that might concern
matters of public interest included political expression, scientific
expression, educational expression, and artistic expression. In extending
the notion of public interest to include a shared public interest, the
courts of the United Kingdom recognized that this expansion of the
common law of qualified privilege was more accurately described as a
defense rather than a privilege because it was so much broader in
scope. 80 Although Australia 81 and New Zealand, 82 in following the lead
of Reynolds, gave political expression some greater importance, the
courts of the United Kingdom have thus far refused to give political
expression any such primacy. This partial softening of the cause of the
common law’s imposition of strict liability for defamatory utterances is
welcome. It must also be noted, however, as we shall soon see, that, in
construing the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 83 the European Court of Human
Rights and the courts of the United Kingdom have used the notion of
public concern to impose limits on other types of expressive activity as
well.
While the Court’s decision in Snyder v. Phelps was ostensibly a
victory for freedom of expression, there are, as we noted at the
beginning of this Article, troubling hints that through the Court’s
continued reliance on American common law it might be prepared to
adopt something like the European approach in a wide variety of torts
litigation involving expressive activities. To clarify exactly what I am
driving at, and why I find the possibility of such a development
disturbing, I shall briefly describe the parallel evolution of the American
common law of both intentional infliction of emotional distress and
privacy, as presented in the American Law Institute’s restatements of
the law of torts—as well as developments during the last decade in the
79. See Flood v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [2012] UKSC 11, [2012] 2 A.C. 273 (appeal
taken from Eng.); Jameel v. Wall St. Journal Europe Sprl., [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 A.C.
359 (appeal taken from Eng.).
80. See, e.g., Jameel, [2006] UKHL 44, [43] (Lord Hoffman). This development has now
been incorporated in Defamation Act 2013. See Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 4 (1) (U.K);
see also infra note 155. This Act has supplanted much of the common law of defamation in
the United Kingdom.
81. Lange v Australia Broad. Corp. [1997] 189 CLR 520 (Austl.).
82. Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385 (CA).
83. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention]. The European Convention has
now been ratified by 47 nations.
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European law of privacy—in order to show how the Court might
possibly be indicating that it is open to considering adoption of
restrictions on expression in the United States that are similar to those
enforced in Europe.
III. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The Restatement of the Law of Torts published in 1934 limited
liability for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, where there
was no intention to cause bodily harm or to put another in fear of an
imminent battery, to common carriers for the “insulting conduct of . . .
[their] servants” to their passengers. 84 In 1948, however, section 46 of
that Restatement was rewritten to declare that “[o]ne who, without a
privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to
another” 85 is liable to that person for any emotional and resulting
physical harm he might sustain. Since expression is probably by far the
most common way people intentionally inflict emotional distress on
others, the constitutional implications of such legal doctrine would now
seem obvious, but apparently in 1948 that was not perceived to be the
case. By the time the portions of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
covering this issue were published in 1965, section 46 was revised in a
manner that perhaps reflected some of those concerns. The scope of
liability was restricted by the requirement that the infliction of severe
emotional distress must be caused “by extreme and outrageous
conduct.” 86 At the same time, however, liability was extended by
imposing liability not only on those who intentionally inflicted that
distress but also on those who did so by their reckless behavior. 87 It was
this provision that was the basis of Jerry Falwell’s initially successful
action against Hustler magazine 88 for a spoof of him in which he was
portrayed as saying that the “first time” he had Campari was during a
tryst with his mother in an outhouse. 89 The jury ruled against him on his
defamation claim on the ground that no one would take the suggestion
of a drunken orgy with his mother seriously. 90 They did, however,
award Falwell significant compensatory and punitive damages for the
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

R ESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 46, 48 (1934).
R ESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948).
R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
Id.
Hustler Magazine, Inc., v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
Id. at 48 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 49.
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intentional infliction of emotional distress. 91 The Court, however,
overturned the Fourth Circuit’s affirmance of this judgment 92 and held
that a public figure could not recover for intentional infliction of
emotional distress unless he could show, with clear and convincing
evidence, that the statements about which he complained were made
with knowledge of falsity or reckless indifference to truth or falsity. 93
Public concern or interest had nothing to do with the matter unless the
Court was implicitly holding that all not knowingly false statements
about well-known figures were ipso facto of public interest or concern. 94
A decade or more after the Falwell decision, the American Law
Institute began the process of producing a Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm. When it completed the
process in 2011, it retained the Restatement (Second) of Torts provision
with no significant change other than substituting “emotional harm” for
“emotional distress.” The complete text, finally published in fall of
2012, more than eighteen months after the Snyder decision, now reads
as follows:
§ 46. Intentional (or Reckless) Infliction of Emotional Harm
An actor who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional harm to
another is subject to liability for that emotional harm and, if the
emotional harm causes bodily harm, also for the bodily harm. 95
There are of course many ways of inflicting severe emotional distress
on others, but surely, as we have several times noted and was the
situation in the Falwell and Snyder cases, infliction of severe emotional
distress by verbal means is among the most common. The possible
91. Id.
92. Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986).
93. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56.
94. What has not been directly addressed is whether the intentional infliction of
emotional distress by intentionally publishing false information about someone is actionable.
For a recent case in which such a claim survived a motion for summary judgment, see
Holloway v. American Media, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 2d 1252 (N.D. Ala. 2013). The case is
unusual in that the plaintiff did not have a privacy interest that would have been covered by
the false light invasion of privacy action that was recognized in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967).
95. R ESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 46 (2012). Undoubtedly for the sake of consistency, this provision has for the
moment been incorporated verbatim in R ESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL
TORTS TO PERSONS § 106 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015). It would be unfortunate if that
decision were not reconsidered.
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conflicts with the constitutional limits imposed by the First Amendment
are obvious. Yet there is no clear recognition of these potential conflicts
in the black letter. The comments of the Restatement (Third) do
declare, citing Falwell, that “the First Amendment imposes limits on the
extent to which state tort law . . . may impose liability for communicative
conduct.” 96 The comments also declare that courts should play “a more
substantial screening role on the questions of extreme and outrageous
conduct and severity of the harm” 97 and should even take a more
aggressive role in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in any
particular case than they would normally do in a case tried to a jury, but
that is hardly adequate. Statements that “an actor is liable only if the
conduct goes beyond the bounds of human decency such that it would
be regarded as intolerable in a civilized community” 98 do not adequately
deal with the matter. Such language recalls Justice Frankfurter’s
declaration in Rochin v. California 99 that the touchstone in Fourteenth
Amendment criminal due process cases is whether the activities
complained of “offend those canons of decency and fairness which
express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples even toward
those charged with the most heinous offenses” 100 or are “so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.” 101 None of these vague and somewhat platitudinous
expressions are adequate to take into account the Court’s decisions
expanding the reach of the First Amendment.
IV. PRIVACY
If expression is perhaps the predominant basis for an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, it should not come as a
surprise that most actions for invasion of privacy likewise seek recovery
for mortification and humiliation from the disclosure of embarrassing
facts about the plaintiff. Indeed, claims for invasion of privacy were

96. R ESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 46 cmt. f (2012).
97. Id. cmt. g.
98. Id. cmt. d.
99. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
100. Id. at 169 (quoting from Justice Douglas’ opinion for the Court in Malinski v. New
York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 (1945)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
101. Id. (quoting from Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,
325 (1937), who in turn was quoting from his opinion for the Court in Snyder v.
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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alternate claims in both the Falwell and Snyder cases. 102 Our discussion
would thus not be complete if we did not also refer to a series of
decisions of the Supreme Court rejecting such invasion of privacy claims
that culminated with The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 103 decided in 1989, a year
after Falwell but well before Snyder. That case involved a breach of
privacy action against a newspaper that published the name of the
plaintiff, the victim of a sexual offense, that its reporter saw posted in
the press room of the local sheriff’s office, which also contained, as
noted in Justice White’s dissent, 104 a posted notice that the names of the
victims of sexual assaults were not matters of public record and were not
to be published. 105 The judgment for the plaintiff rendered in the
Florida courts was reversed by the Court. 106 While the Court was not
prepared to hold that “truthful publication is automatically
constitutionally protected . . . or even that a State may never punish
publication of the name of the victim of a sexual offense,” it
nevertheless declared that “punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at
all,” on a newspaper that “publishes truthful information which it has
lawfully obtained . . . only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of
the highest order.” 107 In his dissent, which was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice O’Conner, Justice White declared that he
doubted whether, if the information were true, there remained “any
‘private facts’ which persons may assume will not be published in the
newspapers or broadcast on television.” 108
Here, again, drafters of the restatements did not take into account
the implications of concurrent constitutional developments. In section
652D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, published in 1977, the
American Law Institute had declared that an action for invasion of
privacy would lie against someone who gave “publicity to a matter
concerning the private life of another . . . if the matter publicized . . .
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and . . . is not of

102. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1214 (2011); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,
485 U.S. 46, 47–48 (1988).
103. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
104. Id. at 546 (White, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 527–28 (majority opinion). The plaintiff reached a settlement with the
sheriff’s department before her case against the newspaper reached the trial stage. Id. at 528.
106. Id. at 529.
107. Id. at 541.
108. Id. at 551 (White, J., dissenting).
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legitimate concern to the public.” 109 That provision received some
support from the Supreme Court of California’s decision in Briscoe v.
Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc. 110 upholding a cause of action against the
Reader’s Digest for republishing an article on the crime of truck
hijacking disclosing that, eleven years previously, the plaintiff had been
convicted and sentenced to prison for participating in a truck hijacking.
The value of that authority, however, was questionable. First, the article
in question was an abridgement of an article that had been previously
published in Chicago. 111 Second, on remand from the Supreme Court of
California, the case was removed to federal court, which dismissed the
case on the ground that no private facts about the plaintiff had been
revealed. 112 Third, and most importantly, in 1975 the Court had held
that a father whose daughter had been raped and killed could not
recover under a Georgia statute forbidding the publication of the name
or identity of a rape victim. 113 The TV station’s reporter had learned the
name of the victim when he was allowed to read the indictment at the
courthouse. In short, the drafters of section 652D of the Restatement
(Second) were certainly on notice, well before the Court’s more
sweeping declaration in The Florida Star v. B.J.F., that their attempts to
state a general rule governing the publication of lawfully acquired true
information about other people were subject to serious constitutional
challenge. Nevertheless, even after the Supreme Court of the United
States’s decision in The Florida Star case and the increasingly strict
constitutional limits on privacy actions being imposed by the Court,
section 652D was, in 2004, accepted by the House of Lords 114 as
accurately expressing the privacy law of the United States and is
perhaps another indication that the notion that courts are the
appropriate bodies to decide what is of legitimate public interest or
concern will simply not go away.
What prompted this interest in the American law of privacy by the
courts of the United Kingdom, which had theretofore refused to
recognize any general right to privacy, was the need to conform the law
109. R ESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
110. 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
111. Id. at 36 n.1.
112. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, Inc., No. LTL 71-2458, 1972 WL 7259, at *2
(C.D. Cal. July 18, 1972).
113. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
114. Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [22], 2 A.C. 457 (appeal taken from
Eng.) (Lord Nicholls).
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of the United Kingdom to the requirements of its membership in the
Council of Europe and then in the European Union. 115 Building on an
expanded notion of confidentiality which did not arise out of any sort of
pre-existing confidential or fiduciary relationship, its courts have ruled
that someone who happens to learn, however innocently, of
embarrassing information about another that is not generally known
and would realize that a reasonable person would not want it to be
generally known is under an obligation not to disclose that information
to others. 116 Through this doctrinal shift it was possible, without much
difficulty, to begin the process of adjusting the common law of the
United Kingdom to the requirements of the European Convention of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the decisions of the
European Court of Human Rights construing that document. 117 In that
process the courts of the United Kingdom have not had much difficulty
in responding to the declarations of the European Court that even
public figures and politicians enjoy some rights of privacy for activities
that take place in the public sphere, particularly when some element of
family life is involved. 118 For example, the Court of Appeal has held
that a newspaper could not publish photographs of the nineteen-monthold son of J.K. Rowling that were taken as the child was being pushed
by his father in a buggy as he accompanied his parents to and from a
café. 119 There is, however, a New Zealand case practically on all fours in
which a unanimous court reached the opposite conclusion. 120
It has now also become accepted, as the law of the United Kingdom
and the forty-six other nations that are members of the Council of
Europe, that it is the task of the courts to decide what is a matter of
public interest that can justify the disclosure of even lawfully obtained
information about another. The European Convention guarantees both
“the right to respect for [an individual’s] . . . private and family life” and
the individual’s right to “freedom of expression.” 121 These rights as well
as the right to “freedom of thought, conscience, and religion” 122 are,
115. See id. at [11]; id. at [138] (Lady Hale).
116. See id. at [14] (Lord Nicholls).
117. See id. at [11]; id. at [86] (Lord Hope).
118. Id. at [20] (Lord Nicholls).
119. Murray v. Big Pictures (UK) Ltd., [2008] EWCA (Civ) 446, [2009] Ch. 481.
120. Hosking v Runting [2005] 1 NZLR 1 (CA).
121. European Convention, supra note 83, at art. 8(1) (privacy); id art. 10(1)
(expression).
122. Id. art. 9(1).
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however, expressly subject to derogation when it is necessary to do so
“in a democratic society” for a number of important social, economic,
and moral reasons including, for example, the public interest in
“national security,” the “public safety,” “the protection of public order,”
“health or morals,” and “the rights and freedoms of others.” 123 As
written, all these rights recognized by the European Convention could
be seen as protected only against the actions of the state, as in the Bill of
Rights of the United States, but it was soon authoritatively determined
that the states that are parties to the Convention were also required to
protect these rights against invasion by private persons.124 Accordingly,
as difficult as it might be to determine when a state might derogate from
such rights for important public reasons, it has now become necessary
for the courts to deal also with what happens if the exercise of one right
guaranteed by the Convention, say the freedom of expression of one
person, was challenged by another person as a violation of his right to
privacy, which is also guaranteed by the Convention.
How, then, is one to balance the conflicting value of these rights as
well as all the other social, economic, and moral interests of the state
that are likewise relevant in a world of expressly defeasible rights? If
that were not enough, the task became even more difficult when,
undoubtedly prompted by the tragic death of Princess Diana in 1997, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe a year later adopted
a resolution declaring that the rights of freedom of expression and
privacy are of equal value,125 a position that was subsequently embraced
by the European Court of Human Rights. 126 It is the need to meet this
challenge that has led European courts to resort to some kind of public
interest or concern test. I have examined elsewhere at some length and
in greater detail how European courts have sought to devise a method
for deciding between two important interests of equal value.127 There is
accordingly no need to do more than summarize those developments
123. Id. arts. 8–9.
124. See, e.g., A. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 25599/94, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 611 (1998).
125. Eur. Parl. Ass., Right to Privacy, 1998 Sess., Res. No. 1165, ¶ 11 (June 26, 1998).
The text of the resolution leaves no doubt that it was largely prompted by Princess Diana’s
death.
126. See, e.g., von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, ¶ 42
(2004).
127. See George C. Christie, Freedom of Expression and Its Competitors, 31 CIV. JUST.
Q. 466 (2012), for a brief recent discussion. For a more detailed and far-ranging discussion,
see GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, PHILOSOPHER K INGS? THE ADJUDICATION OF CONFLICTING
HUMAN R IGHTS AND SOCIAL V ALUES (2011).
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here. To say that one must resort to a balancing process does not get
one very far. How to get past the equipoise situation is the obvious
difficulty, and it is to solve that problem that the public interest test has
been adopted. Since all the cases thus far have involved someone who
claims that his right of privacy has been invaded by another person’s
exercise of his right of freedom of expression, the European courts have
constructed a jurisprudence under which, once the plaintiff has made a
plausible privacy claim, the burden shifts to the defendant to justify the
exercise of his freedom of expression. The inevitable effect, in any close
case, is always to give some degree of primacy to the privacy interest
and thus require the defendant to justify his expression by showing that
his expressive activities further some public interest.
These European developments are of course in marked contrast to
the historical primacy of freedom of expression that has long prevailed
in common law countries in which, if the expression were true or merely
opinion, or even just vitriolic, it would normally triumph over privacy so
long as the expression in question concerned matters that occurred in
public or involved information that was lawfully obtained. 128 The
sweeping suggestion in section 652D of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts that this might not now be the case in the United States because of
the developing law of privacy was no longer plausible as the Supreme
Court of California, 129 a leading advocate of the position taken by the
Restatement (Second), grudgingly admitted in the aftermath of The
Florida Star. 130 I use the word grudgingly because, in accepting that
several of its recent privacy decisions were clearly inconsistent with
contemporary constitutional law, the Supreme Court of California
indicated that, in its view, the constitutional limitations on the reach of
privacy law only applied to the divulging to a greater public of matters
recorded in public records or, if not contained in public records, were
otherwise of public concern or interest. 131 Whether such a logically
narrow construction of The Florida Star case can plausibly be supported
is somewhat debatable. As indicated earlier, 132 the Court in that case
ruled in favor of the newspaper despite the fact that it was agreed that
the notice with the plaintiff’s name that was posted in the pressroom of

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See Christie, supra note 12, at 466, 468.
Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004).
Id. at 562.
Id. at 561–62.
See supra text accompanying note 103.
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the sheriff’s office was accompanied by another notice posted in the
pressroom expressly declaring that the names of victims of sexual
offenses were “not matters of public record” 133 and were not to be
published.
Regardless of whether the California court’s narrow reading of The
Florida Star case is truly plausible, its attempt to narrow the reach of
The Florida Star by preserving some restrictions on the publication of
lawfully acquired true but embarrassing information about another is
certainly clear evidence of the continuing pressure to force some types
of challenged expression to meet a public interest or concern test. We
have seen that possibility arguably supported in the area of intentional
infliction of emotional distress by Snyder v. Phelps when the plaintiff
might be said to be a private figure. We also saw that possibility in the
defamation area in the statements of those Justices who are unhappy
with the extension of the reach of New York Times v. Sullivan and wish
to reinstate many of the aspects of the common law of defamation. And
finally, as we have just noted, the California Supreme Court has opined
that there still are situations where true statements can be challenged on
privacy grounds if they do not touch on matters of “public concern.”
Here again there is some support for that view, quite possibly
unintended, in the United States Supreme Court’s own decisions. In
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 134 the Court refused to allow a tort remedy against
someone who had lawfully obtained and then broadcast the tape of a
conversation between two union officials engaged in a contentious labor
dispute with a local school board that had been illegally recorded by a
third party because the conversation involved an issue of public
concern. 135 While the Court has never recognized that someone who
illegally obtained information about another can escape liability for
disclosing it to the world and has recognized that confidentiality
agreements even regarding matters of obvious public concern are
enforceable,136 Bartnicki leaves open some extremely important as well
as interesting questions. To what extent can one publish to the world
information he has obtained legally even if he knows it has been initially
illegally acquired by (unknown) third parties? Only if it concerns a
matter of public concern? Regardless of whether it concerns a matter of
133.
134.
135.
136.

The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 546 (1989) (White, J., dissenting).
532 U.S. 514 (2001).
Id. at 525.
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669–71 (1991).
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public concern? Or should he be prevented from publishing it at all?
Even to his spouse?
What we do know with some degree of certainty is that someone
who lawfully acquires information that has been illegally acquired by an
independent third party can publish it to the world barring the most
exigent circumstances. The Pentagon Papers137 case and the dicta in The
Florida Star strongly support that view. That conclusion is supported by
the traditional doctrine that, even if the publication of information may
be punishable, there may not be a “prior restraint” on the initial
publication of that information. 138 It is also supported by the Court’s
decision that someone who accidentally overhears a conversation
containing confidential financial information may legally disclose that
information to the world. 139 In Bartnicki, however, the Court, as we
have seen, left open the question not only of whether there might be
some sort of tort remedy for the republication of illegally acquired
information if the information did not pertain to a matter of public
concern but also the question of whether the publisher might be liable to
criminal sanction as well. In point of fact, the intentional disclosure of
any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication by someone
who knows that the information has been illegally obtained is now
ostensibly subject to criminal prosecution. 140 There does not seem to be
any case law on what happens if there are no intellectual property issues
involved nor any connection with any criminal activities, but rather it is
merely the embarrassing private content of the alleged wrongful
publication that is the basis of the complaint. Perhaps even more
germane is the 2006 amendment to the interstate stalking statute to
cover the causing of “substantial emotional distress” not only by
physical stalking, which has often been treated as an invasion of
privacy, 141 but also by the use of the mail or interactive internet
services.142 In United States v. Cassidy, 143 a criminal prosecution seeking
to apply the amended stalking statute to postings on Twitter and
internet websites was dismissed on constitutional grounds. Unlike the
137. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
138. Id. at 714.
139. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 661–64 (1983).
140. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) (2012).
141. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 994–95 (2d Cir. 1973).
142. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, sec. 107,
§ 2261A(2), 127 Stat. 54, 77 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2) (2012)).
143. 814 F. Supp. 2d 574 (D. Md. 2011).
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Cassidy case, however, in which the “victim” was a well-known figure,
the statute was held to be applicable in a subsequent case in which not
only was the victim a private person but the messages in question could
easily be considered to be attempts to extort money from her as well as
threats of violence. 144 One would think that an attempt to prosecute
someone for using the mail or the internet to inflict emotional distress
on a private figure, where there was neither any threat of violence nor
other criminal behavior, would certainly fail.
The battle between freedom of expression and privacy is an
inevitable one. It becomes increasingly important legally because, in the
modern world, many thoughtful people believe not only that the state
should itself avoid infringing the recognized legal rights of its citizens
but also that it must protect the emotional tranquility of private people
from trauma inflicted by other people’s exercise of their freedom of
expression. One can say that in the United States, at least at present,
primacy is given to expression when it comes in conflict with privacy or
other interests involving emotional tranquility. 145 How great that
primacy will continue to be or should be is the matter in dispute. As we
have noted, in Europe this preference is reversed. 146 If expression
receives considerable legal primacy in the United States, it is not
because expression is a more important social or moral value than is
privacy or emotional tranquility but rather because, for the body politic,
the political importance of expression is a more important concern. It is
said that, in contrast, expression does not get the same primacy in the
civil law countries of Europe as it does in the United States because, in
Europe, notions of personal honor have historically often trumped

144. Decision and Order on Defendant Sayer’s Motion to Dismiss Count One of the
Indictment and Defendant Thomas’s Motion to Dismiss Count Eight of the Superseding
Indictment at 3–6, United States v. Sayer, No. 2:11-CR-47-DBH (D. Me. May, 15 2012), ECF
No. 94; see also Memorandum Opinion and Order, United States v. Shrader, No.
1:09-cr-00270 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 8, 2010), ECF No. 42, 2010 WL 503092.
145. It is this primacy to freedom of expression that gave rise in 2010 to federal
legislation that no foreign judgment for defamation shall be recognized in United States
courts if the defamation law of the foreign jurisdiction does not provide “at least as much
protection for freedom of speech and press . . . as would be provided by the first amendment
to the Constitution of the United States and by the constitution and law of the State in which
the domestic court is located.” Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established
Constitutional Heritage Act, Pub. L. No 111-223, sec. 3, § 4102(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 2380, 2381
(2010) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a) (2012)).
146. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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freedom of expression. 147 A recent extension of that perspective is the
decision by a Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European
Community that a person could require Google to delete links to
material in the public domain produced by Google’s search engine.148 In
that case the complainant wanted Google to delete, in its response to a
search using his name, links to articles published twelve years earlier in
a large circulation newspaper reporting that his name had appeared in
connection with “attachment proceedings for the recovery of social
security debts.” 149 That right could be overridden if “it appeared, for
particular reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public
life, that the interference with his rights is justified by the preponderant
interest of the general public in having, on account of inclusion in the list
of results, access to the information in question.” 150 While it is troubling
that someone could be punished for the publication of information not
generally known but already published and discoverable by anyone
willing to take the trouble of accessing governmental or private archives
open to public access, the decision of the European Court of Justice is
unfortunately certainly compatible with the California Supreme Court’s
application of section 652(D) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the
Briscoe case that we have discussed earlier. 151
V. THE CASE FOR THE STRONGEST POSSIBLE PROTECTION OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
The strongest policy argument for according the greatest practically
possible freedom to expression that is not false is that, without freedom
of expression, a truly democratic free society cannot exist. That
necessity is conceded by the people who would prefer a more restrictive
approach by their agreeing that “political speech” should be given
147. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,
113 Y ALE L.J. 1151 (2004).
148. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
(May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&do
clang=EN, archived at http://perma.cc/VV7B-6CQX.
149. Id. ¶ 98. The court acknowledged that the article could still be publicly accessible
through the newspaper’s website. See id. ¶¶ 85, 87.
150. Id. ¶¶ 97, 99. According to Google’s website, as of April 14, 2015, it had received
239,337 requests for removal, and it had evaluated 867,930 URLs that had been requested to
be removed, of which it had removed 41.5% and not removed 58.5%. European Privacy
Requests for Search Removals, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/removal
s/europeprivacy/ (last updated Apr. 14, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/Z5NP-P3CP.
151. See discussion supra notes 110–14.
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greater leeway. But who is to determine what are the outer limits of
political speech? Other types of expression that it has been accepted
might, as a general matter, qualify as topics of “public interest” include
scientific expression, educational expression, and artistic expression. 152
These terms are not self-defining. Determining what expression is
actually scientific expression or what is legitimate educational
expression or really artistic expression is not an easy task. The criterion
of contribution to “a debate of general interest” enunciated by the
European Court of Human Rights is hardly more helpful. 153 The
problem of who decides is fraught with difficulties. If one is trying to be
as objective as possible, one might try to find out by empirical research
what the “public” is actually interested in or concerned about.
Presumably that is what Justice Powell was driving at in Gertz when he
separated the universe of defamation plaintiffs into public officials and
public figures on the one hand and private figures on the other. 154
Surely he was assuming, with some justification, that the concept of
public notoriety was a more objective criterion than what was a matter
of public interest or concern.
One might also say that, in the world in which we live, the fact that
someone goes to the trouble of engaging in public discourse with people
who he believes might be interested in what he may say is evidence that
he thinks that there is a public demand for the information that he is
providing, especially if he is seeking compensation for his efforts. In
Europe, including the United Kingdom, that objection has been
preempted by the judicial declaration that the fact that the public,
however defined, is interested in some information does not mean that
the publication of that information or the expression of those ideas is in
fact in the public’s interest. 155 It is for the courts to determine what is
“really” or “truly” in the “public” interest. 156 It is hard to believe that
152. Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [148], 2 A.C. 457 (appeal taken from
Eng.) (Lady Hale).
153. See von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, ¶¶ 65, 76
(2004).
154. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341–48 (1974).
155. Jameel v. Wall Str. Journal Europe Sprl., [2006] UKHL 44, [49], [2007] 1 A.C. 359
(appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Hoffman). Insofar as defamation is concerned, the public
interest and the entrusting of that issue to the judiciary has now been incorporated in
section 4 of Defamation Act 2013. Defamation Act 2013, c. 26, § 4 (U.K.). The Act also
eliminated the requirement that actions for defamation should be tried with a jury unless “the
court orders otherwise.” Id. § 11.
156. See, e.g., Jameel, [2006] UKHL 44, [49]. See also von Hannover v. Germany, App.
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the courts are adequate to the task and particularly so in a modern
nation state that is constantly becoming more and more diverse. It is
certainly abundantly clear that the content of what are considered to be
matters of scientific, educational, or artistic interest or of “legitimate”
public interest, taken in its broadest sense, changes over time,
sometimes over a relatively short period of time. In upholding the
confiscation of “obscene” paintings, in 1981, that the European Court of
Human Rights agreed might no longer be considered obscene at the
time it rendered its decision in 1988, it noted that “the requirements of
morals var[y] from time to time and from place to place, especially in
our era.” 157 This changing public and judicial notion of what is obscene
is only one instance. As noted at the very beginning of this Article, it is
hard to believe that someone could be sent to jail for making the
statements for which Chaplinsky was convicted. 158
The most that even the most conscientious judges, in large part
drawn from the “respectable” elites of society, can do is reflect the
No. 59320/00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, ¶¶ 76–77 (2004), where the Court rejects the German
courts’ evaluation and made its own categorical evaluation. In that case the Court held that
photographs of Princess Caroline of Monaco taken in public places, such as while she was on
vacation, invaded her privacy. In von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2), App. Nos. 40660/08,
60641/08, 55 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15 (2012) (Grand Chamber), photos of her taken while she was
skiing on vacation in Switzerland escaped condemnation because they were published as part
of a story about what the children of Prince Ranier, the ruler of Monaco, were doing while he
was ill. One daughter stayed home with the prince while Caroline and her brother went on
vacation.
157. Müller v. Switzerland, App. No. 10737/84, 13 Eur. H.R. Rep. 212, ¶ 35 (1988). The
painters had been convicted, and the confiscation of the paintings upheld, by a court in
Fribourg in 1982, despite the fact that similar paintings had already been exhibited in Basel.
The European Court also noted that some four months before its judgment in May, 1988, the
paintings had been returned to the artists. This changing notion of what amounts to “art” is
also illustrated by Vereinigung Bildender Künstler v. Austria, App. No. 68354/01, 47 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 5 (2007). The dissent of Judge Loucaides is a good illustration of the subjective nature
of the decision-making process of these cases. The law in the United States is more favorable
to the defendant in the sense that to succeed the prosecution must prove to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt (1) that the challenged work appealed to prurient interest, (2) that it was
patently offensive, and finally (3) that a reasonable person would find such works, taken as a
whole, without literary, artistic, or scientific value. That many or a majority of people would
find that the work did not possess such value is not the issue. Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497,
500−01 & n. 4 (1987). I for one would agree with Justice Brennan, who dissented in part,
“that any regulation of such material with respect to consenting adults suffers from the defect
that the concept of ‘obscenity’ cannot be defined with sufficient specificity and clarity.” Id. at
507 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 103 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
158. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942); see also text
accompanying note 9.
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mores of the social classes from which they are drawn and in which they
are educated and spend their professional and social lives. What they
would most likely be doing, despite their best intentions, is imposing a
certain notion of political correctness on society at large, something like,
but hopefully less corrosive than, the frequent attempts in the not too
distant past to impose college speech codes.
There is a final and perhaps more telling practical objection. With
the rise of the internet it will become increasingly difficult and very
often truly impossible to prevent the distribution of offensive
expression. Notions such as the exalted function of the press as the
public watchdog to whom some greater privilege of expression might be
given are not only unwise but are likely to be inadequate to prevent
distribution. Moreover, such distinctions require the courts to decide
whether blogs or “chat rooms” are really media. It is chimerical to
believe that they could accomplish that task without making some
extremely arbitrary distinctions. In this regard one should note that
there are social sanctions that can discourage offensive speech,
sometimes even more effectively than legal sanctions. Attempts by
Phelps to promulgate his “crusade” by displaying vulgar signs at funerals
have increasingly been rendered ineffective by counter demonstration,
as when his group tried to demonstrate at Elizabeth Edwards’ funeral in
Raleigh, North Carolina.159 Although the self-described Nazi march in
Skokie was given permission to proceed, as it should have been, the
march was canceled when it became clear that a much larger counterdemonstration would make the Nazis look ridiculous. 160
I agree that there must be some restrictions on public expression
even of information that is not false and has not been illegally acquired.
Most people in advanced societies take it for granted that the state
should prohibit threats of immediate violence that are coupled with an
apparent ability to carry out that threat. There are likewise strong
moral and other policy reasons to protect children from severe
emotional distress caused by outrageous behavior, including verbal
behavior. There are likewise good reasons to prohibit outrageous
verbal behavior towards an adult that the speaker knows is mentally
handicapped, just as would be the case if a person, knowing that a

159. Andrea Weigl, ‘Line of Love’ Overwhelms Tiny Turnout of Protestors, N EWS &
OBSERVER, Dec. 12, 2010, at 7A.
160. Douglas E. Kneeland, Nazis Call Off March in Skokie; Leader Says Drive Was a
Success, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1978, at A10.
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person is handicapped, tried to defend his carelessly injuring that person
by asserting that his conduct would have been reasonable if the injured
person had not been physically handicapped. Furthermore, the fact that
the expressive activities take place in public space does not mean that
there may not be reasonable time, place, and manner for regulation of
that expression. All people have the right to use public space and to
observe what goes on there, but no one has the right to monopolize
public space. We also do and should punish the unauthorized
publication of information that someone has obtained illegally or
through a confidential or fiduciary relationship. Material about an
individual contained in public records, if it has been obtained under an
implied promise of confidentiality, should not be open to the world, and
public employees who are responsible for public disclosure are quite
properly subject to sanction. 161 In a rapidly changing world, it is hard to
say much more at a general level beyond, to paraphrase and broaden
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s declaration for the Court in The Florida
Star, that “punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all,” on someone
who “publishes truthful information” (or matter that is not false) which
has been “lawfully obtained” “only when narrowly tailored to a state
interest of the highest order.” 162

161. In this regard it should be noted that the sheriff’s department responsible for
allowing BJF’s name to be made public settled her action against it. See supra note 105.
162. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989).

